Abstract-Electronic commerce has pushed and benefitted from the development of mobile agents technology. One of the reasons is electronic commerce needs remote searching and negotiating between one customer and a number of E-shops. Mobile agents can travel over the Intranet or Internet. Therefore, mobile agents can help the customer or E-shops with remote searching and negotiating. However, because of the heterogeneousness of the networks the mobile agents migrate to, security issues should be tackled with cautions. This paper presents a new secure electronic commerce protocol. The underlying transactions are accomplished with mobile agents. A trusted third party (in fact, a trusted authority) is involved in the protocol.
Here the successful bidder is the E-shop, whose bid is accepted and paid by the customer. An additional state of this scenario is the underlying E-shop denies either bidding any purchase plan of the customer or receiving any money to her account.
In this paper we will propose a secure transaction protocol to address the above scenario. The underlying techniques are based on a new proxy signature scheme [4] . Han et al have presented another new proposal for secure transactions using mobile agents with agent broker. Their method is based on the concept of undetachable signatures [ZI.
Our protocol is designed to protect jnanciul situations or rights of the customer. This is maintained through the signature on the bid from the corresponding E-shop. Therefore, it can not only help the Customer to verify whether this bid is really from the underlying E-Shop, but also prevent this EShop from denying providing this bid for the purchase plan.
Another issue is some previous solutions have the security flaw [ 5 ] , [6] , [8] , [ l l ] , [14] . In detail, the customer can forge valid bid on behalf of the E-shops. consequently, the customer can blackmail the underlying E-shop by the fabricated bid [ 
161.
Then, the financial situation of the E-shops will be spoiled by the customer. In our protocol, the customer is not able to forge any valid bid on behalf of any E-shop involved in the transactions. ' In our protocoI, a trusted third party is invohed in the transaction. The trusted third party (TTP) in our paper satisfies two conditions: (1) The trusted third party does exactly what it is expected to do. This means (a) No less than it is supposed to do, so that TTP commits no acts of commission, such as, "Oh, I forgot to lock the door." and (b) No less than it is expected to do, so that TTP commits no acts of commission, such as, "Oh, I accidently made an extra key and gave it to Eve." (2) The trusted third party always adhere to the related security law and policy. Therefore, a reputable bank (or a legal ahd reputable association, etc.) is able to play the role of the trusted third party [16] , [19] . Based on this point, the trusted third party in our paper is indeed a trusted authority.
The organization of the rest of our paper is as follows: Section. 2 introduces the model of secure transactions using mobile agents with a trusted third party. Section 3 presents a new protocol according to the proposed model. Section 4 provides construction analysis, security analysis, and privacy analysis. The performance analysis is presented in section 5. The concluding remarks are provided in section 6.
II. MODEL OF TRANSACTIONS USING MA WITH TTP
In this section, we will propose a model for secure transactions using mobile agents (MAS) with the trusted third party (TTP). The motivation to propose this model is the needing of a universa1 framework for the E-commerce protocols of secure transactions using mobile agents as a mediate. This model integrates the serviceability of a trusted third party.
Model 1 (Model of Transactions Using MA with TTP) There are at least four participants involving in the model. They include: a customer, a trusted third party, an E-shop (at least one E-shop involving), and a mobile agent (at least one mobile agent involving). Besides these participants, there are seven procedures for the proposed model. These procedures detiver the specifications for the electronic commerce protocol using mobile agents with TTP. The followings provide the details for the model.
(1) System Setup: This procedure is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm [16]. It generates global parameters as well as Eocul parameters for the participants involving this procedure.
(2) Interaction between E-Shop and TTP: This procedure is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm. It generates the pseudonyms and partial private keys for the E-Shops, who plan to sell goods in the protocol.
(3) Preparing Mobile Agents: This procedure is a polynomial time algorithm. It involves the interactions between the customer and its mobile agents.
(4) Mobile Agents Migrating: This procedure is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm. In this procedure, the mobile agents are equipped with a purchase request (It includes the purchase requirements and some ciphertexts of partial secrets). And then, mobile agents migrate to some E-shops. E-shops will first check whether this purchase request is legal.
(5) Processing Transactions: This is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. The underlying E-shop first constructs the bidding key, by which this E-shop is able to make bidding for the purchase request. The process of bidding for the purchase request is, in fact, fhe process ufsigning E-shops' bid.
(6) Checking Transactions: This procedure is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm. The customer first checks whether the returned purchase requirement is still the one previously delivered by the mobile agents. In addition, the time-stamp is examined whether it is still valid. If the two items are both good, the customer will verify the signature on the bid. and also the bid is an optimal one, the customer will accept this (7) Auditing E-Shop: This procedure is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. This procedure is usually off-line, except that the underlying E-shop does not take its duty in the transaction.
PROPOSED PROTOCOL FOR TRANSACTIONS USING
MA WITH TTP In this section we will propose a new protocol for transactions using mobile agents with a TTP. The proposed protocol is specified according to the new model given in section 2.
Therefore, this protocol includes the following procedures: System Setup, Interaction between' E-Shops and TTP, Preparing Mobile Agents, Mobile Agents Migrating, Processing Transactions, and Checking Transactions, as well as Auditing i-th E-Shop. A new proxy signature scheme [] is implied in the protocol. Its security is based on the security of DSS. Therefore, the proposed electronic commerce protocol has the same security level with the DSS. In addition, fair identifiability as a new security and privacy mechanism is maintained in the protocol.
A. System Setup
In this subsection, we will set up the system parameters for the proposed protocol. In the proposed protocol, there are at least four different participants: a Customer, a Trusted Third Party, an E-Shop, and the Mobile Ageits (at least one Mobile Agent involving in the underlying transactions). The followings are the specifications of the global parameters as well as the the local parameters:
(I) Choice of Global Parameters There is a large prime p .
where L is a multiple of 64, and 512 5 L 5 1024. q is another large prime, where q divides p -1 and bit-length of q is 160. Let k be a primitive
Therefore, q is the order of g modulo p .
. Each E-Shop ESi (I 5 z 5 n). registers
' herhis ideniity ID:' ( 
Constructing Purchase Requirements According to the current purchase plan, the Customer will construct the corresponding purchase requirements. These purchase and rTTP, = gkTTPt mod p (1) requirements will be assigned to the corresponding mobile agents in order to seek an optimal transaction. The Customer constructs the purchase requirements as fallows:
The will play the role of the pseudonym for each E-Shop ES, ( 
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+ kTTqmod q (3) plan, the purchase requirements are all equal, i.e. and then sends the tuple In!), &LP, TTTP,} to each E-Shop 
C. Preparing Mobile Agents
As soon as the Customer initializes any purchase, shehe arrange them to some E-Shops ES, ( chooses random numbers k,$j E 2;' k , (2) E Zp'. . . . , k g ) E Zp', and computes (4) Equipping Mobile Agents The Customer will equip these mobile agents with the above public parameters and partial secrets. In detal, the Customer provides each Mobile Agent MA, (1 5 j 5 n) with the corresponding tuple r g ) = gkg'mod p.
~g )
= g'C mod p , ( 5 ) (6) ( 2 ) ..., and checks whether the purchase requirement J c is legal or not. That is, the i-th E-Shop will examine whether the time-stamp on J c is valid. If it is not valid, this E-Shop will stop, since this purchase request is out of date. If it is valid, this E-Shop will go on the next step. . If it is not valid, this E-Shop will stop, since the current purchase plan may be spoiled. If it is valid, this E-Shop will take part in the bidding for the purchase plan of the Customer.
E. Processing Transactions
In this procedure, the i-th E-Shop will first construct herhis own bidding key Sbrd. by which this E-Shop can bid for the purchase plan initialised by the Customer. Shehe will then construct the bidding of herhis goods to this purchase. And -859 -then, the i-th Modile Agent will be equipped with this bidding and return to its owner, i.e. the Customer. Note that the bidding key i s kept secret by this E-Shop. The detailsof this procedure is as follows: (1) the description of the i-th E-Shop's goods; (2) the minimum price that will be acceptable to the z-th E-Shop; (3) a due date for the delivery of the goods; (4) a bank account number provided by the i-th E-Shop; (5) a due date for transferring money into the bank account; (6) an expiration date and time-stamp, that implies the valid period of the bid &d. ' (3) Signing the Bid In order to make this bid confirmed and accepted by the Customer, the i-th E-Shop will put a legal signature on the bid &d. This will not only help the i-th EShop improve the possibility of the Customer accepting this bid, but also help the Customer to verify whether this bid i s really from the i-th E-Shop, as well as prevent the i-th EShop from denying providing this bid for the purchase plan. The details of this procedure is as follows:
The i-th E-Shop computes m,
The a-th E-Shop chooses a random number k, k E Z,*, and sets
w The i-th E-Shop computes 0, Therefore, the signature on the bid &id is {a, p } , If it holds, the Customer accepts this bid as valid. If it does not hold, the Customer will arrange the j-th Mobile Agent M A j (where 1 5 j 5 n and j # ij to seck an optimal bid for the current purchase plan.
G. Auditing i-th E-Shop
The following scenario may take place: After verifying the transaction tuple, the Customer accepts the bid B b z d as an optimal bid. Therefore, she transfers some money as the price listed in the bid. However, the i-th E.Shop denies ever receiving any money and sending any bid. How can we deal with this situation? Who will audit the i-th E-Shop? The details given below provides a solution to this scenario. 
A. Construction Analysis
Generally speaking, construction analysis serves as' a functional deloyment from the construction, operationability, and functioning points of view, This .subsection will provide a deployment for the proposed. transaction protocol.
In our protocol, we have introduced a customer, a trusted third party, an E-shop, and a number of mobile agents. However, in a virtual electronic commerce environment, there will be more than one customer as well as more than one E-shop. For the complex scenario, it is easy to extend the proposed protocol to a multiple level of electronic commerce transactions protocol. Therefore, in the following we only deploy the protocol from the simple and concise perspective.
(1) Role of the Customer: The customer first proposes a purchase plan. Around the purchase plan, she constructs the purchase requirements
which direct the underlying E-shops to bid for the purchase plan. Here, J c includes: (1) the description of a desired product; (2) an expiration date and time-stamp, that implies the valid purchase period; (3) the maximum price that is accepted to the Customer; (4) a due date for the delivery of the product; and ( 5 ) an address for the delivery of the product.
Also, the customer constructs mobile codes (26) for the mobile agents. Note that a vdid signature on the bid includes J c . That is, J c is used IO restrict the context ofthe bidding tuken by the E-shops. Other parts of the mobile code, i.e.
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is used to generate the bidding key for the E-shops.
Another duty of the customer is she will verify the bids returned by the mobile.agents. If it is valid, she will transfer some money to the E-shop's bank account.
(2) Functioning.of the Mobile Agents: The main duty of the mobile agents is to help its owner accomplish the purchase plan. They actually interact with their owner and the E-shops, respectively. (As noted in Remark 1, We know that the E-shops are also some mobile agents.) For the interaction between the mobile agents and their owner, the mobile agents are equipped with some mobile codes:
where I 5 j 5 w. For the interaction with the E-shops, the mobile agents transport some bids: 
(30)
The other role of TTP is to audit the E-shops during the course of the transactions. This service is accomplished using the following equation:
N( JD$) R, IC;)) = n$).
.
(4)
Role of the E-shops: The E-shops take part in bidding for the purchase initiated by the customer. Therefore, The Eshops need to have bidding private key and public key: Sbid (1) Strong unforgeability of any bid of the underlying Eshops. This property is valid with respect to the customer.
This means that the Customer is not able to forge valid any bid on behalf of any underlying E-shop. From Equation (3)
. and (31), we have It is difficult to figure out the value of $bid, since ICTTP, and ZTTP are two random and private elements of 2;. If the customer tries to tackle Equation (20), she will need to solve the discrete logarithm problem [16] . On the other hand, from Equation (22) and (23), the underlying bidding signature is based on the DSS [ 1 XI. Therefore, the strong unforgeability is maintained.
(2) Fair Identifiability of the underIying E-shops. This property is valid with respect to the E-shops. Fair identifiability means that no one is able to identify the underlying Eshop whose bid is accepted by the customer. An exceptional situation is the trusted third party can identify the underlying E-shop through the pseudonym. This only takes place when the E-shop denies ever bidding and receiving money in the transactions. In fact, from the signature generated by the Eshop
BbidlrC Ins , I D c ? J i l f f l P~ any one except cannot identify the underlying E-shop. This is because: (a) B b i d ={the description of the underlying E-Shop's goods; the minimum price that will be acceptable to the underlying E-Shop; a due date for the delivery of the goods; a bank account number provided by the underlyinig E-Shop; a due date for transferring money into the bank account; an expiration date and time-stamp.} It does not leak any information of the identit for the underlying E-shop. using a hash function. and (b) ng) = H ( I @ ) , Ri, ki J ). Therefore, ID; is mapped (3) Verifiability of the bid of the underlying E-shops. This property is valid with respect to any one who holds the related public parameters. Verifiability means that any one who holds the related public parameters can check whether a bid is valid. It i s easy to conclude this point from the process of Checking Transactions (see Section 3. F).
(4) Undeniability of the bid in the transactions. This property i s valid with respect to the E-shops. Undeniability means that the underlying E-shop cannot deny she ever generated a valid signature on the bid. In fact, from Equation (29) we know that nk is theoretically linked to this E-shop. More importantly, the verifying equation (gTlyi:dmod p)mod q = Q implies this E-shop ever generated the signature on the bid. This point is derived from the procedure of Processing Transactions as well as Checking Transactions.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The performance of .the proposed electronic commerce protocol can be discussed from two aspects: off-line workloads and on-line workloads. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a new electronic commerce protocol. The proposed protocol integrates mobile agents with the underlying transactions, The mobile agents help to accomplish the purchase plan initiated by the customer. A trusted authority is integrated and plays two important different roles: one is help the E-shops register; the other is help to maintain the fair privacy. We have provided proofs for construction and security.
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